Statistical Red Flags and The Guys Who Beat Them
A statistical red flag is serious business. But which NBA draft prospects tend to overcome them, and what can we learn from that information? Maxwell has you covered!
As someone who loves to dabble in NBA Draft data, the phrase “statistical red flag” pops up on a consistent basis. Heck, I use it a lot myself! Any time we’re talking about statistical red flags, though, it’s important to consider the context of the player.
Let’s say, hypothetically of course, that we’ve got a big man who struggles at the rim. Most long-term NBA big men who played in college made around 69.3% of their halfcourt shots at the basket during their pre-draft season. Hypothetically, let’s say that this prospect only made 59.7% of his attempts in that area. That’s a red flag! Then add in that this player had a below-average number of dunks, and he’s seemingly way behind the curve. But you’re going to want to be careful before you throw the baby out with the bathwater. Let’s say that big prospect was also an efficient player on the whole, posting a 64.7 TS%. And let’s say they took 7.4 threes per 100 possessions, making 39.6% of them. And let’s say that even if they weren’t the best finisher, they still liked contact and posted a .573 free throw rate. Let’s also say, hypothetically speaking of course, that this player posted an incredible 14.3 BLK% while displaying an amazing level of defensive versatility.
Now, the finishing doesn’t seem like that big of an issue. That’s because the player we’re talking about is Jaren Jackson Jr. during his tenure at Michigan State. Was he the best finisher entering the league? No. But he was tough, shot the cover off the ball, and played defense in a way that few on earth can match. Plus, the lower number of dunks can be explained away by his role—he was a more perimeter-oriented player who was often slotted in lineups next to another big. So, while Jaren Jackson Jr. had a statistical red flag on his resume, he also had all the tools to compensate for it.
When looking at other big men who struggled to finish in college but still found NBA success, shooting was a common thread. Luke Kornet might not take threes anymore, but his ability to stretch the floor allowed him to get his foot in the door multiple times before evolving into the player he is now. Naz Reid struggled at the basket, too, but it was his perimeter skill that allowed him to get over that hurdle. Dudes like Jalen Smith and Chris Boucher were subpar finishers, too. Ideally, you want tall guys to be able to convert inside at a high clip. But if a guy can shoot, there’s room for error.
Today, we’ll be discussing various statistical red flags, and more importantly, the guys who can overcome them. Feel free to apply these lessons to players of your choice in the upcoming 2025 NBA Draft. Or don’t, it’s your call!
DISCLAIMER: All statistics are relative to long-term NBA players within their position group during their pre-draft seasons. For the sake of simplicity, I’ve organized percentiles into the following tiers: Great (81st through 100th percentile), Good (61st through 100th percentile), Adequate (41st through 60th percentile), Subpar (21st through 40th percentile), and Poor (20th percentile and below).
The Red Flag: Low-Dunk Guards
When I first got into the scouting space, I often saw dunks used as a proxy for athleticism. I’ve got to say, generally speaking, it’s a good one! I’d also occasionally see certain guard prospects derided for failing to register many dunks. It makes sense—if you’re going to be small, ideally, you’d need a high level of athleticism to compensate for it. However, it’s not a death sentence. Let’s take a look at the list below.
Long-term NBA guards since 2017 with one or zero dunks during their pre-draft season:
-Jalen Brunson
-Devonte’ Graham
-Immanuel Quickley
-Bryn Forbes
-Gabe Vincent
-Jose Alvarado
-Payton Pritchard
-Tre Mann
-Tre Jones
-Fred VanVleet
-Shake Milton
-Trae Young
Hey, maybe being low on dunks isn’t the end of the world! A lot of these guys are really good! Of course, that doesn’t mean that you want a guy who doesn’t or can’t dunk. There’s a laundry list of one and zero dunk guards who flamed out. But let’s examine some common throughlines among this group.
-Eleven of the 12 were Adequate or better at the free-throw line; nine of the 12 were Good or better.
-Ten of the 12 graded out as Adequate or above in terms of True Shooting Percentage; 7 of them were in the Good tier or above.
-Ten of the 12 were Adequate or better in terms of three-point percentage, and nine of the 12 were Adequate or better in terms of three-point volume. Tre Jones was the only player to be Subpar or worse in both categories.
-Eight of the 12 were Adequate or better in assist-to-turnover ratio
-Eight of the 12 were Adequate or better in steal rate
-Eight of the 12 were Adequate or better in free-throw rate
-DBPM wasn’t much of a factor at all. Only Jose Alvarado, Tre Jones, and Fred VanVleet had a DBPM above the Adequate threshold.
-BLK%, perhaps unsurprisingly, correlated heavily with the number of dunks. Only Shake Milton and Tre Jones graded out as Adequate or better in that respect.
-It was also common for these guys to struggle as finishers in general. Only four of the 12 posted Adequate or better percentages on their halfcourt rim attempts.
So, when you’re looking at guards who struggled to finish above the rim, these are things to keep in mind. You’re going to want to see some combination of efficiency, outside shooting, ball control, the ability to generate steals, and an ability to get to the free-throw line. And while it isn’t easily quantifiable, I think it’s worth noting how many of these prospects have physical advantages that exist outside of vertical athleticism. Guys like Jalen Brunson and Fred VanVleet are extremely powerful. Immanuel Quickley and Jose Alvarado have serious speed. Having a different athletic trait to compensate goes a long way.
The Red Flag: Low Stock Wings
“Stocks,” or “steals + blocks,” is a useful proxy for athleticism and feel. If an athletic player can functionally harness their gifts, they should be able to produce steals and blocks at a healthy clip. There’s also the other side of that coin, where players who might be lacking ideal physical traits still manage to find ways to create events defensively by outsmarting opponents. But when you have players who don’t generate much on the stat sheet defensively, it becomes cause for concern. If the player can’t win with athleticism, feel, or some blend of the two in college, then what hope do they have of staying on an NBA floor? Welp, let’s dig in. For this grouping, I’m defining wings as players who predominantly play the two and/or three spots.
Long-term NBA wings since 2017 with subpar steal AND block rates in their pre-draft season:
-Terance Mann
-Cam Thomas
-Luke Kennard
-RJ Barrett
-Sam Merrill
-Austin Reaves
-Amir Coffey
-Malik Monk
-Bennedict Mathurin
-Buddy Hield
-Malik Beasley
-All 11 players had an Adequate or better free-throw rate
-Nine of the 11 players had an Adequate or better OBPM
-Eight of the 11 players had an Adequate or better usage rate.
-Eight of the 11 players had an Adequate or better True Shooting percentage.
-Eight of the 11 players had an Adequate or better turnover rate.
-Eight of the 11 players had an Adequate or better free-throw percentage.
-Eight of the 11 players had an Adequate or better catch-and-shoot three-point percentage.
-Eight of the 11 players had an Adequate or better percentage of their shots taken at the rim in the halfcourt.
-Seven of the 11 players graded out as Good or better in number of dunks.
-Seven of the 11 players had an Adequate or better Effective Field Goal percentage.
-Seven of the 11 players had an Adequate or better three-point percentage.
-Seven of the 11 players had an Adequate or better BPM.
-Seven of the 11 players had an Adequate or better assist-to-turnover ratio.
There’s a lot to unpack here. The biggest thing I would say is that in general, when you see a low stocks player, you’re looking for efficient, mistake-free play on offense. The free-throw rate number, in particular, jumped out to me. We’re seeing patterns of a healthy shot diet—guys who get to the line, make free throws, hit catch-and-shoot threes, and manage to pressure the rim respectably. Also, not only did they produce efficiently, but they typically did so on respectable usage. These players also did a good job of taking care of the ball, as evident by the turnover rate and assist-to-turnover marks, even if they weren’t necessarily guys who generated a ton of assists. Lastly, the dunks number took me by surprise a little bit. I think that, in combination with the usage rate, points to guys who were athletically capable, but conserving themselves a bit for the offensive end of the floor. The “low dunks” guys (Cam Thomas, Luke Kennard, Austin Reaves, and Sam Merrill) in this group were all lethal catch-and-shoot players. If you don’t see the dunk numbers you want, that’s probably the next place to look.
The Red Flag: Forwards Who Can’t Shoot
The NBA desperately craves big dudes who can guard both forward spots and space the floor. But what do we make of those players who can’t space the floor just yet? Let’s find out.
Long-term NBA forwards since 2017 with subpar three-point volume and percentages in their pre-draft season:
-Ben Simmons
-Grant Williams
-Kyle Kuzma
-Jalen McDaniels
-Patrick Williams
-Trendon Watford
-Jae’Sean Tate
-Isaac Okoro
-Scottie Barnes
-Peyton Watson
-Derrick Jones Jr.
-Pascal Siakam
-Eleven of the 13 players had an Adequate or better ORB%.
-Eleven of the 13 players registered an Adequate or better number of dunks.
-Ten of the 13 players had an Adequate or better percentage of their shots taken at the rim in the half court.
-Nine of the 13 players had an Adequate or better AST%, with eight of the 13 grading out as Good or better.
-Nine of the 13 players had an Adequate or better STL%, with eight of the 13 grading out as Good or better.
-Nine of the 13 players had an Adequate or better FTr.
-Eight of the 13 players had an Adequate or better usage rate.
-Eight of the 13 players had an Adequate or better True Shooting percentage.
-Eight of the 13 players had an Adequate or better field goal percentage at the rim in the halfcourt.
-Eight of the 13 players had an Adequate or better assist-to-turnover ratio.
-Eight of the 13 players had an Adequate or better DRB%.
-Only five of the 13 players had an Adequate or better BPM or OBPM.
-Only four of the players were Adequate or better free-throw shooters.
If you’re not a shooter, you better be some combination of athletic, tough, and smart. The guys who overcome shooting woes tended to be players who could pressure the paint, finish above the rim, and crash the offensive glass. Those traits allow them to remain efficient overall, even if they struggle from deep. I also thought the assist, steal, and assist-to-turnover marks were meaningful. It’s important to have physical advantages, but a lot of these players were also able to pair those traits with mental processing in order to impact the game on both ends of the floor. It’s also worth noting how rare it is for these guys to become league-average shooters on volume. Basically, you’re wiser to bet that a non-shooter can be a guy who does all the other stuff than you are banking on a non-shooter to suddenly turn into a knockdown guy.
The Red Flag: Low Assist Big Men
The NBA requires more skill out of its big men than ever before. So, what do we make of incoming prospects who struggle with their passing? Let’s find out!
Long-term NBA big men since 2017 with subpar assist rates AND subpar assist-to-turnover ratios in their pre-draft season:
-John Collins
-Naz Reid
-Daniel Gafford
-Moritz Wagner
-Zach Collins
-Isaiah Stewart
-Zeke Nnaji
-Chris Boucher
-Jalen Smith
-Jarrett Allen
-Mo Bamba
-Bam Adebayo
-Jericho Sims
-Jaxson Hayes
-Ten of the 14 players had an Adequate or better usage rate.
-Ten of the 14 players had an Adequate or better True Shooting percentage.
-Ten of the 14 players had an Adequate or better ORB%.
-Ten of the 14 players had an Adequate or better free-throw rate.
-Nine of the 14 players had an Adequate or better effective field goal percentage.
-Nine of the 14 players had an Adequate or better field goal percentage at the rim in the halfcourt.
-Nine of the 14 players had an Adequate or better OBPM.
-Nine of the 14 players registered an Adequate or better number of dunks. Eight of the 14 graded out as Good or better in that respect.
If you’re not going to come into the league ready to facilitate, you better come in ready to do the dirty work. The most common throughlines here were that the guys who overcame playmaking woes were those who were ready to crash the glass, finish the easy stuff inside, and get to the foul line.
Survivorship Bias
The last thing I want to touch on in this piece is Survivorship Bias. In this exercise, we looked at players who managed to overcome red flags in their statistical profile and found NBA success, as well as what commonalities existed across their games. Still, that doesn’t necessarily mean that a player who shares traits with those who succeeded will also succeed, because we’re exclusively looking at the players who did get over the hump.
A good way to think about this is in terms of Jaylen Wells and Cam Christie. In my “long-term NBA player database,” I tend to exclude rookies, so Wells wasn’t a part of the “low stock wings” group discussed earlier. Both Wells and Christie were good college shooters on high volume who took care of the ball well but struggled to finish inside and produce on defense. If we were to do this same exercise a year from now, I’d likely include Wells on the “long-term NBA players” list, whereas for Cam Christie, that might not be the case.
I say all this to say it’s not a guarantee that someone will necessarily have a long-term NBA career because that player has similar red flags and strengths to a long-term NBA player who has succeeded in the past.
Conclusion
The main reason I wanted to write this piece was to add nuance to the discussion around statistical red flags. Sure, a player might be well behind the curve in a certain element of their game. In some instances, the issue could be so severe that it prohibits them from finding NBA success. But I want to encourage people who run into red flags or shortcomings to continue asking questions. Be curious! Ask how it could work itself out, and see what trends exist among those who’ve managed to overcome that issue in the past. Look at some of the guys on these lists—Jalen Brunson, Austin Reaves, Jarrett Allen…these guys went undervalued on draft night. Perhaps their statistical shortcomings in one area or another played a part. But by figuring out which players are more likely to beat red flags, teams can find exceptional value on draft night.
Loved this article.